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One of the major current policy initiatives of the New 
Zealand government is the introduction of the quasi-market 
approach for the delivery of social housing under the Social 
Housing Reform Programme. The Social Housing Reform 
Programme seeks to increase the participation of third-party 
not-for-profit community housing providers in delivering 
social housing in competition with Housing New Zealand 
Corporation (Minister of Housing, 2012). What has become 
known as the ‘quasi-market’ approach in social policy is based 
on the idea of creating competition and using market-based 
incentives. The rationale of this approach is that if prices are 
based more on supply and demand, then resource allocation 
will be more efficient. Applied to housing, the argument is 
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that providers will respond to increased 
market demand for rental accommodation 
by increasing supply, and competition 
between providers will induce more 
responsiveness to the needs of tenants, 
which will lead to higher quality and more 
choice and better constrain rental costs 
(Le Grand and Bartlett, 1993). 
Background 
Social housing can mean different things 
in different contexts and countries 
(Kemeny, 2007). In New Zealand, Housing 
New Zealand Corporation, a state-
owned enterprise, with approximately 
68,000 social housing units, provides 
the overwhelming majority (94%) of 
social housing. Housing New Zealand 
tenants pay an income-related rent 
limited to 25% of household income, up 
to an income threshold. The government 
pays Housing New Zealand an income-
related rent subsidy (IRRS), being the 
difference between the income-related 
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rent paid by the tenant and the assessed 
market rental value of the property. Social 
housing in New Zealand is ‘residualised’ 
(Kemeny, Kersloot and Thalmann, 2005), 
characterised by strict means-tested access 
with prioritisation based on severity 
of need, and is therefore the preserve 
of the poor. In addition to Housing 
New Zealand, local authorities provide 
approximately 9,000 social housing units 
(mostly in Christchurch and Wellington), 
while a small number of regionally-
based community housing providers, 
with around 5,000 units in total, provide 
supported accommodation, typically 
focused on a specific sector such as 
people with physical or mental disability 
(Housing Shareholders’ Advisory Group, 
2010; Treasury, 2014). 
Under the Social Housing Reform 
Programme the government:
•	 has	extended	access	to	the	income-
related rent subsidy to community 
housing providers on the same 
basis as Housing New Zealand 
to establish funding neutrality. 
The aim is develop a plurality of 
providers, increasing competition 
and the supply of social housing 
accommodation. The income-related 
rent subsidy provides the income 
stream for community housing 
providers to cover operating, funding 
and maintenance costs; 
•	 has	initiated	large-scale	stock	
transfers from the Housing New 
Zealand portfolio to community 
housing providers, initially planning 
to sell 2,000 state houses with 
existing tenants in place, in order 
to create competitors of ‘scale’ with 
Housing New Zealand; and
•	 will	‘purchase’	a	specific	number	of	
income-related rent subsidies from 
the ‘market’ (i.e. some aggregate 
of Housing New Zealand and 
community housing providers), 
thereby controlling its expenditure 
on social housing and enabling the 
government to compare providers 
to ‘ensure that they get the most 
efficient supply options’. (Minister of 
Housing, 2012, p.9)
The new policy, the government 
believes, will increase tenant choice, 
enhance the quality of housing, and 
address equity issues through better 
incentive structures and regulation.
Le Grand and Bartlett (1993) propose 
a number of criteria for assessing 
whether the conditions for the successful 
establishment of a quasi-market have 
been met. The criteria include: the degree 
to which a competitive market structure 
is established; the impact on ‘transaction 
costs’ associated with risk and uncertainty, 
requiring complex contractual 
negotiations and regulatory costs; the 
impact of market disciplines on the 
motivation and entry of new providers; 
and the potential for ‘cream skimming’ 
(i.e. the extent to which discriminatory 
or opportunistic behaviour arises under 
a quasi-market model). This article draws 
on these criteria and overseas evidence to 
assess whether the government’s reforms 
to social housing are likely to achieve 
their stated objectives. It also looks briefly 
at alternative policy directions.
Establishing a competitive market structure
Creating effective competition
One of the requirements of a successful 
quasi-market approach is to create a 
competitive market and allow prices 
to respond to supply and demand, and 
therefore drive productive and allocative 
efficiency (Le Grand and Bartlett, 1993). To 
achieve this the government has extended 
the market-linked income-related rent 
subsidy to community housing providers. 
It is assumed that, with access to this 
subsidy, capital (i.e. philanthropic equity 
and private loan capital) will be attracted 
to the social housing sector, thereby 
increasing the number of providers. This 
will enhance competition and increase 
the supply of social housing. However, the 
Treasury acknowledges that the evidence 
to support such assumptions is limited 
and difficult to quantify (Treasury, 2012, 
2015). Overseas experience highlights that 
even in situations such as in England in 
the 1990s, where conditions and policies 
were much more conducive than in the 
current New Zealand context, effective 
competition did not emerge. Geographic 
market power was retained, mergers and 
acquisitions were common to gain scale, 
and agreements not to compete were 
reached, especially around development 
land (Bramley, 1993; Gibb, 2005). In New 
Zealand the outlook for the establishment 
of a competitive social housing market is 
not promising.
The government initially provided 
capital subsidies to community housing 
providers of up to 50% of the cost 
of social housing units. However, the 
Treasury advised the government that, at 
the forecast level of capital expenditure 
on social housing units, it would be ‘hard 
to say that a functioning, competitive 
market was in place or on the way to 
being created’ (Treasury, 2012, p.5). 
Despite some initial transactions, capital 
subsidies were deemed ineffective and 
expensive and are not being pursued. The 
policy focus therefore shifted to large-scale 
stock transfers, similar to the approach 
in England in the 1990s, in order to 
provide competitors with scale to compete 
with Housing New Zealand. According 
to Treasury, the Housing New Zealand 
portfolio would need to be less than 70% 
(compared to the current 94%) of the 
social housing market to generate sufficient 
competition. This implies that more than 
20,000 houses will need to be transferred 
to community housing providers before 
One of the requirements of a successful 
quasi-market approach is to create a 
competitive market and allow prices to 
respond to supply and demand, and 
therefore drive productive and allocative 
efficiency ...
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competition can effectively emerge. 
Furthermore, the Treasury advises that 
between 500 and 1,500 units would be the 
‘minimum’ required to achieve providers 
of ‘scale’ (Treasury, 2012). However, the 
New Zealand community housing sector 
has been described as ‘boutique’ (Capital 
Strategy/SGS Economics and Planning, 
2007), with the Housing Stakeholders’ 
Advisory Group (2010) estimating that 
existing providers typically have only 20 
units (Housing Stakeholders’ Advisory 
Group, 2010). This implies the need 
for a substantial increase in the size of 
community housing providers’ social 
housing portfolios and raises questions 
about how such an expansion is to be 
funded and managed. 
Lack of capital a ‘fundamental barrier’
The government recognises that a 
‘fundamental barrier’ to such an expansion 
is the ‘shallowness’ of the community 
housing sector’s capital base. This is most 
acutely felt in high-value areas, which also 
have the highest level of unmet demand, 
thereby exacerbating the problem 
(Minister of Finance and Minister of 
Housing, 2014). This represents an 
inherent contradiction in the policy logic, 
given that one of the original primary 
drivers of the policy was the purported 
ability of community housing providers 
to access capital from ‘multiple public and 
private philanthropic sources’ (Minister 
of Housing, 2012, p.9).
Capital subsidies will be required
The community housing sector has called 
for upfront capital grants to assist it in 
purchasing or developing social housing 
(Davidson, 2015). The Treasury notes 
that overseas evidence indicates that 
‘capital investment or subsidies are often 
needed for a significant period of time 
before providers become self-sustaining’ 
(Treasury, 2010b, p.6). The social housing 
minister cites community housing provider 
uptake of social housing in Australia as 
an example of the success of increasing 
the sector’s involvement in social housing 
(Bennett, 2015a). However, Yates (2013) 
highlights that Australian community 
housing providers’ involvement in social 
housing was stimulated by the Australian 
Federal Labour government’s A$5.6 billion 
investment in supply- and demand-side 
subsidies in 2009 as part of a response to 
the global financial crisis. The minister 
cites Trust House in Masterton as an 
example of community housing providers 
delivering social housing in New Zealand. 
However, the unit growth for Trust House 
has been ‘less than one unit per year over 
its history and [it] still depends on a 
government loan at zero interest in order 
to be financially sustainable’ (Bennett, 
2015b; Norman and Teahan, 2015, p.55). 
Overall, the emergence of competition 
or an increase in social housing supply 
via community housing providers are 
unlikely given the current boutique scale, 
sector capital constraints and absence of 
capital subsidies. The need for capital 
subsidies will likely remain a key policy 
requirement for community housing 
provider participation.
Efficiency and effectiveness under the  
IRRS approach
Despite the evidence of the need for 
capital subsidies, the government has 
instead chosen to rely almost entirely on 
the demand-side, market-linked income-
related rent subsidy to encourage private 
providers to enter the social housing 
market. Accordingly, little progress is 
likely. Indeed, Treasury has argued that 
establishing a contestable IRRS pool will 
not be a ‘particularly efficient or effective 
way to grow future supply’ (Treasury, 
2013, p.6). 
Financial viability of social housing under the 
IRRS model
The Treasury identifies that, in addition 
to the lack of capital noted above, low 
investment returns are a significant 
barrier to community housing providers 
investing in social housing (Treasury, 
2012). KPMG modelling of social housing 
costs for Australian community housing 
providers highlights low returns as a key 
factor inhibiting supply growth (cited in 
Yates, 2013). The KPMG study indicates 
that return on assets ranges between 
0.3% and 1.4%, which is not adequate to 
accumulate cash for future growth. This 
range of returns, however, is similar to that 
calculated for Housing New Zealand and 
deemed unacceptable for the New Zealand 
government (Minister of Housing, 2012). 
The financial viability of the New Zealand 
approach may be even more problematic 
given that the government is seeking to 
achieve ‘market’ value for the houses (Key, 
2015), while under the Australian model 
the houses are transferred to community 
housing providers ‘at no cost and no debt 
obligation’ (Yates, 2013, p.22). 
According to the Treasury, under the 
current IRRS model, as applied to Housing 
New Zealand, there is a substantial ‘gap’ 
between what Housing New Zealand 
earns and what a ‘reasonable commercial 
provider would need to earn in order to 
cover the cost of capital’ (Treasury, 2012, 
p.6). In a residualised social housing 
model the gap is maximised, given that 
most tenants’ incomes are based on a 
welfare benefit. The implication is that the 
gap may well be the same for community 
housing providers, and they may have 
even higher per-unit costs and therefore 
a higher subsidy requirement (Treasury, 
2013). 
IRRS as a driver of efficiency benefits
In traditional markets, allocative efficiency 
is achieved through prices reflecting 
supply and demand. However, as the 
Treasury (2012) acknowledges, with social 
... under the current IRRS model ... there is 
a substantial ‘gap’ between what Housing 
New Zealand earns and what a ‘reasonable 
commercial provider would need to earn in 
order to cover the cost of capital’ ...
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housing based on need rather than price, 
a true market is unlikely to emerge. In 
New Zealand, as overseas (Gibb, 2005), 
the market rental prices which determine 
the value of the IRRS for social housing 
providers are set by the government 
and providers, largely without tenant 
input. The government intends to use 
its position as a monopoly funder and 
purchaser through the Ministry of Social 
Development to override the ‘market’ by 
specifying units of modest quality and 
amenity value, and apply a maximum rate 
that it is prepared to pay, based on the lower 
two market quartiles (Kirk, 2015). This 
will suppress price signals and undermine 
allocative efficiency (Bramley, 1993). In 
addition, Treasury notes that, as a means 
of generating productive efficiency, the 
IRRS approach is likely to be ‘ineffective’ 
as it ‘removes any tension over prices 
between the provider and the tenants’ 
(Treasury, 2010a, p.8). The centralised 
allocation process for social housing is 
unlikely to lead to improved services 
or lower rents until there is a surplus in 
capacity, especially in high-demand areas 
(MacLennan and More, 1997). Longer-
term contracts guaranteeing access to the 
IRRS (Bennett, 2015a) will likely further 
undermine efficiency benefits, as, once the 
initial contract has been negotiated, the 
contract is ‘transformed’ into a long-term 
supply arrangement, reducing competing 
bidders (Tadelis and Williamson, 2012).
Tenant choice
It is suggested that competition will 
improve tenant choice. For effective 
tenant choice there must be spare 
capacity, or ‘slackness’, of appropriately 
configured accommodation within 
the same geographic area in order to 
engender competition between Housing 
New Zealand and community housing 
providers (MacLennan and More, 1997). 
Given the conclusion that there is unlikely 
to be a significant increase in competition, 
waiting lists will remain, undermining 
effective tenant choice. In a residualist 
model like New Zealand’s, with social 
housing centrally allocated and provided 
only to those in serious need (often after 
long waiting times), vulnerable families 
with high needs are likely to take the 
first rental offered (either by Housing 
New Zealand or a community housing 
provider) rather than choosing between 
several options (Boyle, 2015). In addition, 
the policy may lead to an increase in waiting 
times, given that, to ensure fiscal control, 
the Ministry of Social Development will 
be provided with a capped budget for 
subsidies. The Treasury advises, therefore, 
that the ministry will now not only need 
an appropriate property to be available, 
but will also need the capacity to fund an 
additional subsidy (New Zealand Treasury, 
2013).
Effective choice is further undermined 
by the new social housing allocation rule. 
This reduces the number of social housing 
choices a family can decline to one before 
being subject to a 13-week stand-down 
period (Bennett, 2015c). 
Cost-effectiveness of the IRRS model
The IRRS funding model may also be the 
most expensive option for the government 
over the medium to long term. The prime 
minister, John Key, argues that it is more 
cost-effective paying $12 million per 
annum in income-related rent subsidies 
to community housing providers than 
the government investing $500 million 
in building 1,000 houses (Hickey, 2015). 
However, analysis of funding options for 
social housing in England indicates that 
the option similar in principle to the IRRS 
(i.e. zero capital subsidies, full market 
rent but subsidised rents for tenants) 
will be the most expensive option over 
the medium to long term (ten years or 
more) (PricewaterhouseCoopers and 
L&Q, 2014). This is because the cost of the 
subsidy is linked to property prices and 
rental inflation, which normally rise faster 
(especially in high value, high demand areas) 
than social housing tenants’ incomes. This 
increases the level of the required subsidy 
but does not lead to a commensurate 
increase in supply. This is similar to 
the current situation in New Zealand 
(Treasury, 2015a). Alternative funding 
models, where capital subsidies are 
contributed upfront and rents are set 
based on costs, avoid the rental subsidy 
rising in tandem with rising property 
values (PricewaterhouseCoopers and 
L&Q, 2014). This raises serious questions 
about the structural ability to reduce 
social housing expenditure over the longer 
term under the Social Housing Reform 
Programme.
Transaction costs
For the quasi-market approach to be cost-
effective, the purported benefits from 
increased competition must be greater 
than the transaction costs. Transaction 
costs take the form of detailed contractual 
negotiations, and compliance, inspection 
and enforcement costs, to protect each 
party’s property rights. With high levels 
of complexity and uncertainty, it may 
be more cost-effective to internalise 
production within an organisation, 
avoiding the need, ex ante, to codify all 
future circumstances and contingencies 
into a contract (Tadelis and Williamson, 
2012). Under the Social Housing Reform 
Programme, ‘right size, right place’ risks 
currently born by the government are 
effectively being transferred to community 
housing providers. The risk for community 
housing providers is that, because of 
changing client needs, market conditions 
or new providers, the government does 
not renew or seeks to renegotiate terms 
and conditions. Realisation of such risks 
would significantly undermine the value 
of the community housing provider’s 
social housing portfolio, raising asset 
specificity risks. Mitigation of such risks 
requires contractual protection, raising 
complexity and costs, especially where a 
consortia approach is adopted (Chapman 
For the quasi-market approach to be 
cost-effective, the purported benefits 
from increased competition must be 
greater than the transaction costs.
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Tripp, 2015). In addition, the cost of the 
regulatory framework should not be 
underestimated. British evidence shows 
an increasing regulatory burden, as well as 
difficulties of enforcement if tenants are 
not to be adversely affected (Chisholm, 
2015; Gibb, 2005; Adams, Tiesdell and 
Weeks, 2010).
Motivation of providers 
Much of the success in using a quasi-
market approach relies on the aspiration 
of individual community housing 
providers to grow. But such organisations 
have diverse motivations and may not 
have the objective to grow, or be willing 
to take on the associated risks (Bramley, 
1993). For example, in Australia not all 
community housing providers utilise the 
ability to leverage acquired assets (Yates, 
2013). In addition, the quasi-market 
approach has, for profitability reasons, 
seen a shift in focus to affordable housing 
based on ‘mixed’ tenure developments, 
with – in the UK – ‘inclusionary zoning’ 
requirements used to specify a minimum 
number of social housing units (Chevin, 
2013). Such approaches severely limit 
the supply of new social housing stock, 
leading to an overall decline in the total 
supply of social housing (Thornhill, 
2010). The same approach is being 
followed in New Zealand. For example, 
the Tämaki regeneration project has the 
un-aspirational target that the number 
of social housing units will not diminish 
(Moir, Kirk and Carnegie, 2015). 
Cream skimming 
Currently, under Housing New Zealand 
the allocation of social housing is based on 
need. Housing New Zealand cannot exercise 
a choice not to provide a house if the 
tenant meets the relevant criteria and one 
is available. In a residualist model, tenants 
often have complex needs and these can 
be costly to service. If community housing 
providers have the ability to decline tenants 
or focus on particular segments of the 
market they may ‘cherry pick’ the lowest-
cost clients or discriminate on gender, 
ethnicity, religious or other grounds. British 
evidence indicates that some housing 
associations did discriminate against high-
cost tenants (Bramley, 1993). In respect of 
social housing in New Zealand, this may 
increase the concentration of high-need 
and costly tenants within the Housing New 
Zealand portfolio, undermining Housing 
New Zealand’s ability to provide adequate 
service levels and leading to further 
marginalisation of those in its portfolio. 
Summary 
The preceding analysis suggests that the 
government’s Social Housing Reform 
Programme is most unlikely to achieve its 
goals of increasing third-party participation, 
improving the efficiency of the delivery 
of social housing and significantly 
increasing total supply. Indeed, the policy 
appears to be inherently flawed. It seeks 
to increase social housing by accessing 
the capital resources of the community 
housing sector, but it is acknowledged 
that one of the major constraints is the 
‘shallowness’ of the capital pool within 
that sector. This inherent contradiction 
limits the degree to which competition can 
emerge and supply increase, which then 
undermines improvements in efficiency, 
responsiveness, or choice for tenants. 
However, rather than addressing this issue 
through capital subsidies, the policy offers 
only the demand-side IRRS. Yet there are 
real concerns as to the financial viability 
of social housing under the IRRS model. 
At the same time, the IRRS model will 
likely be the most expensive option for the 
funding of social housing over the medium 
to long term, given that the subsidy 
increases with market prices but does not 
lead to commensurate additional supply. 
The rent-setting process under the IRRS 
model will likely only allow for a weak 
relationship between prices and market 
conditions, undermining any improvement 
in allocative efficiency. The motivation 
for community housing providers to be 
involved in delivering social housing may 
be constrained by commercial imperatives. 
The centralised allocation process and 
ongoing lack of supply is unlikely to 
increase effective tenant choice. Finally, 
significant equity concerns may arise 
where community housing providers have 
the opportunity to decline tenants, leading 
to discrimination and cream skimming as 
high-cost tenants are excluded in favour of 
those with lower costs. 
Alternative policy options 
If a core goal of social housing reform is 
to satisfy unmet need in a cost-effective 
manner, then other policy options must 
be considered. Four possibilities are briefly 
outlined here.
Increase funding for Housing New Zealand
The first option is to abandon the 
proposed reforms and focus on expanding 
the stock of housing via an increased level 
of public investment through Housing 
New Zealand. Given Housing New 
Zealand’s economies of scale and scope, 
and access to existing land and resources, 
it may well be able to deliver a significant 
increase in social housing more quickly 
and cost-effectively than community 
housing providers. Evidence suggests 
that, historically, substantial increases in 
supply have been associated with public 
investment (Brandsen and Helderman, 
2006; MacLennan and More, 1997; Yates, 
2013). If, for example, Housing New 
Zealand’s Tämaki development (Tämaki 
Redevelopment Company, 2015) focused 
on maximising social housing rather 
than attempting to offset project costs by 
developing for-profit affordable housing, 
a meaningful increase in social housing 
could be achieved.
Provide capital subsidies to community 
housing providers
The second option is to re-establish 
capital subsidies for community housing 
Overall, the new Social Housing Reform 
Programme lacks internal consistency 
and is unlikely to achieve the purported 
benefits.
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providers. Lack of capital is identified 
as one of the main constraints on the 
community housing sector for increasing 
supply growth (Davidson, 2015; Minister 
of Finance and Minister of Housing, 2014). 
The main advantage of this approach is 
that capital grants or subsidies would 
reduce the risk for community housing 
providers, allow their limited capital to 
stretch further and enhance their ability to 
secure private funding. This option would 
need to include a reconsideration of the 
IRRS model and a shift to a cost-based 
rental system, which is likely to be a more 
cost-effective solution over the medium 
to long term (PricewaterhouseCoopers 
and L&Q, 2014).
Gifting of stock
The third option is to adopt the Australian 
approach and transfer the assets free of 
charge to community housing providers. 
The advantage of this approach is that 
it minimises capital contributions from 
the government, but with a withdrawal 
of equity being reflected through the 
revaluation of the Housing New Zealand 
portfolio. The disadvantage is that there 
is less cash to recycle into social housing 
(Treasury, 2015), and it may still be 
insufficient to induce supply growth 
(Yates, 2013).
Development of a cost-based rental sector 
through community housing providers
The fourth option is to embark on a 
transformational programme, turning 
social housing away from a residualist, 
needs-based model of the kind currently 
evident in New Zealand to a model of cost-
based rental accommodation provided by 
community housing providers, closer to 
that witnessed in parts of Europe, such 
as the Netherlands. The Treasury advises 
that, rather than seeing home ownership 
as the path to independence (Minister of 
Housing, 2012), for those currently in the 
residualist form of social housing support 
should be provided, to develop a long-
term, affordable rental accommodation 
market (Treasury, 2012b). 
In the Netherlands and other parts of 
Europe, community housing providers 
have been used extensively to provide 
access to affordable housing on a cost 
rental basis, and with long-term security 
of tenure. Social housing in this context 
is open to a much broader segment of the 
population. Access is not means-tested, 
although it is prioritised on need (Kemeny, 
2007; Scanlon and Whitehead, 2008). 
Rents are set based not on the market 
but on actual costs of management, 
maintenance and capital, allowing rents to 
be kept low when housing is provided by 
not-for-profit entities. One of the effects 
of the cost-based rental approach is that 
it provides more choice of tenure and 
higher levels of responsiveness through 
greater competition, and efficiency by, 
over time, driving down prices in the for-
profit rental market (Davidson, 1999).
Developing this form of social 
housing has decided merit in the 
context of the housing affordability 
crisis in Auckland and the emergence of 
‘generation rent’, who increasingly seek 
affordable and secure rental housing 
(Eaqub and Eaqub, 2015). This will be 
of increasing importance over time, 
with higher numbers of New Zealanders 
reaching retirement age without having 
achieved home ownership (Statistics New 
Zealand, 2013). While significant public 
resources would be required, it may be 
more politically acceptable given that the 
policy targets a growing segment of the 
mainstream population. 
Conclusion 
The justification for introducing the quasi-
market approach in social housing in New 
Zealand is that it will increase allocative 
and productive efficiency, provide access 
to alternative sources of capital, increase 
supply, and enhance the choice of 
provider and quality of accommodation 
for tenants. The preceding analysis raises 
serious questions about the validity of 
each of these claims in relation to the 
recent social housing reforms. Overall, the 
new Social Housing Reform Programme 
lacks internal consistency and is unlikely 
to achieve the purported benefits. Indeed, 
there is a risk that some of those with the 
most serious housing needs will be worse 
off. Accordingly, other policy options 
require consideration. Arguably, the best 
long-term approach would be to adopt 
a policy framework closer to that of 
countries like the Netherlands and develop 
a cost-based rental housing sector, where 
good quality, secure and affordable rental 
accommodation is available to a much 
broader segment of the New Zealand 
population than has hitherto been the 
case. However, to make such a transition 
would require political leadership, multi-
party commitment and sustained capital 
investment over several decades.
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